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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the recent turn in Justice Kennedy’s race 
jurisprudence. The shift is palpable, from a narrow and 
uncompromising approach to the use of race by state actors to a 
more nuanced and contextual understanding of the role that race 
plays in American society. This is no small change, best explained by 
Justice Kennedy’s status on the Court as a “super median.” This is a 
position of power and influence, as any majority coalition must count 
on Justice Kennedy’s vote; but more importantly, it is also a position 
of true independence. Justice Kennedy entertains his idiosyncratic 
and very personal views on the questions of the day because he can. 
He can even contradict himself. 
Far more important than pinpointing the reasons for Justice 
Kennedy’s newfound jurisprudential awareness are the implications 
of this shift. This Article examines three implications. First, litigators 
must learn Kennedy-speak and whatever issues occupy the Justice’s 
attention. Second, a constitutional world where one justice single-
handedly controls constitutional doctrine places grave stress on the 
moral legitimacy of judicial review. This is the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty on steroids. Finally, the implications for constitutional law 
are severe. In particular, this Article argues that the fate of the 
Second Reconstruction hinges on the idealism of Justice Kennedy. 
Reflecting on the Court’s 2010 October Term, this Article concludes 
that the Second Reconstruction—and particularly the Voting Rights 
Act, the crown jewel of the civil rights movement—appears safe for 
now. 
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“It’s Justice Anthony Kennedy’s country—the rest of us just 
live in it.”1
INTRODUCTION
In his concurring opinion in Georgia v. Ashcroft,2 Justice 
Kennedy warned that “considerations of race that would doom a 
redistricting plan under the Fourteenth Amendment or § 2 [of the 
Voting Rights Act] seem to be what save it under § 5 [of the Act].”3
As the present case did not raise this issue, the Court could avoid it 
for the moment. But he made clear that the Court must confront this 
                                                     
1. Noah Feldman, The United States of Justice Kennedy, BLOOMBERG 
VIEW (May 31, 2011, 9:52 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2011-05-
30/how-it-became-the-united-states-of-justice-kennedy-noah-feldman. 
2. 539 U.S. 461 (2003). 
3. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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“fundamental flaw” in the future. More recently, in his concurring 
opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano,4 Justice Scalia similarly warned that 
the Court’s resolution in Ricci “merely postpones the evil day on 
which the Court will have to confront the question: Whether, or to 
what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee 
of equal protection?”5 To his mind, “the war between disparate 
impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it 
behooves us to begin thinking about how—and on what terms—to 
make peace between them.”6 He underscored that this was not an 
easy question. 
The future is here. In two recent cases, the Court began to 
examine, in ways it has never examined before, the constitutionality 
of the Second Reconstruction. The first case, Shelby County v. 
Holder, considered the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act.7
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court struck down the Act’s 
coverage formula and by implication cast grave doubts on the future 
of our civil rights edifice.8 The second case, Texas Department of 
Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 
Inc., considered the constitutional viability of the disparate impact 
test.9 After Shelby County, a case best explained as a crass exercise in 
judicial attitudinalism,10 the continued constitutionality of the Second 
Reconstruction was grim. But in a surprising 5–4 opinion, Justice 
Kennedy concluded that disparate-impact claims were cognizable 
under the Fair Housing Act.11 It would appear, contra Shelby County,
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act are safe, at least in the short term. How can this apparent 
shift be explained?  
For clues, consider the 2006 Term and the notorious and deeply 
fractured Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1 decision.12 Few decisions have garnered as much 
attention in the last few years as Parents Involved. In an opinion 
                                                     
4. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
5. Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
6. Id. at 595-96. 
7. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).  
8. See id. at 2630-31.  
9. 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015). 
10. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State’s Rights, Last 
Rites, and Voting Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481, 520-21 (2014).  
11. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2525. 
12. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
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authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court struck down two 
voluntary racial integration plans for public schools in Louisville and 
Seattle.13 But only a plurality of justices would go as far as to 
prohibit any use of race in student assignments.14 Justice Kennedy 
provided the fifth vote yet refused to go quite that far. In a separate 
concurrence, he left open some room for school boards to consider 
the use of race in student assignments while pursuing the goal of 
integration.15 This is the aspect of Kennedy’s opinion that strikes a 
familiar chord. He is comfortably in the middle, wielding inordinate 
power and control as the Court’s “super median.”16 This is also 
where the familiarities end.
To read Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Parents Involved is to see 
a side of the Justice we have not seen before. This is true from the 
first paragraph of his opinion: 
The Nation’s schools strive to teach that our strength comes from people 
of different races, creeds, and cultures uniting in commitment to the 
freedom of all. In these cases two school districts in different parts of the 
country seek to teach that principle by having classrooms that reflect the 
racial makeup of the surrounding community. That the school districts 
consider these plans to be necessary should remind us our highest 
aspirations are yet unfulfilled.17
This opening salvo highlights Justice Kennedy’s posture in his 
concurrence. The framing is inescapable. Take, for example, his 
view later in the opinion that “[t]he enduring hope is that race should 
not matter; the reality is that too often it does.”18 In direct response to 
the plurality’s pithy phrase that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on 
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,”19
Kennedy argues that “[f]ifty years of experience since Brown v. 
Board of Education should teach us that the problem before us defies 
so easy a solution.”20 Kennedy even takes on Justice Harlan’s dissent 
in Plessy v. Ferguson and the view that “[o]ur Constitution is color-
                                                     
13. Id.  
14. See id. at 725-33, 745-48. 
15. See id. at 787-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
16. See Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37 
(2008). 
17. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
18. Id. at 787. 
19. Id. at 748 (plurality opinion).  
20. Id. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (citation omitted). 
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blind.”21 This statement often stands at the heart of conservative 
attacks on race conscious measures. Yet Kennedy argues that while 
justified in the racialized context of the late-nineteenth century, it is 
not justified today as anything more than an aspiration. “In the real 
world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional 
principle.”22
These arguments should surprise anyone familiar with Justice 
Kennedy’s race jurisprudence. In his concurring opinion in City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,23 for example, Justice Kennedy wrote 
that “[t]he moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of 
the Equal Protection Clause.”24 In saying this, he counseled that the 
use of race by the state must only be “a last resort.”25 Similarly, in his 
dissenting opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger,26 he referred to the use of 
race by the state as a “corrosive category”27 and argued that:  
Preferment by race, when resorted to by the State, can be the most divisive 
of all policies, containing within it the potential to destroy confidence in 
the Constitution and in the idea of equality. The majority today refuses to 
be faithful to the settled principle of strict review designed to reflect these 
concerns.28
These are hardly isolated instances. Over the course of his long 
tenure on the bench, Justice Kennedy has demonstrated time and 
again that his approach to the use of race by the state is narrow, 
formalistic, and one that ultimately renders the state action at issue 
unconstitutional.29
The contrast between these two judicial approaches to the use 
of race by the state is palpable. But it is more than just the explicit 
words that Justice Kennedy uses to express his views; it is the spirit 
in which he writes them and the tenor of his opinions. To read his 
early opinions on race is to see an unyielding skepticism about the 
use of race by the state. This is true across contexts, whether college 
                                                     
21. Id.  
22. Id.
23. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
24. Id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
25. Id. at 519. 
26. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
27. Id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
28. Id. at 388. 
29. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927-28 (1995); Presley v. Etowah 
Cty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 509-10 (1992); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 395 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 592-93 (2009). 
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admissions,30 employment,31 set-asides,32 or redistricting.33 But his 
more recent opinions—of which both Parents Involved34 and 
Inclusive Communities Project are appropriate examples—cannot be 
similarly catalogued. The racial skepticism remains, to be sure, but it 
is a skepticism now tempered by a far different view of the world 
and of the role that race plays within it, both as historical artifact and 
social reality. Even as he joined the judgment of the Court in Parents 
Involved, for example, Justice Kennedy wrote that “[t]his Nation has 
a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to 
creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all 
of its children.”35 Similarly, in LULAC v. Perry, a case that examined 
the notorious mid-census political gerrymander in Texas,36 Justice 
Kennedy concluded that the decision to dismantle a district where 
Latino voters would soon achieve majority status violated the Voting 
Rights Act.37 This was a remarkable departure for Justice Kennedy, 
not the least of which because this was the first time during his 
tenure on the Court when he voted to find a statutory violation under 
the Act.38 What makes his LULAC opinion “striking”39 is the reason 
he offered for his conclusion: that the state had only decided to break 
up the old District 23 when Latinos within it “had found an 
efficacious political identity.”40 This is a remarkable position for a 
justice who held a strong anti-essentialist view on questions of race 
as late as 2001.41
                                                     
30. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
31. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 563. 
32. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Metro Broad., Inc. 
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 631 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
33. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 903. 
34. For a terrific analysis of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Parents Involved,
see Kevin Brown, Reflections on Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in Parents Involved:
Why Fifty Years of Experience Shows Kennedy Is Right, 59 S.C. L. REV. 735 (2008). 
35. 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
36. 548 U.S. 399, 409 (2006). 
37. Id. at 438-39, 442. 
38. Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal 
Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104, 109 (2007).  
39. Id.
40. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 435. 
41. I refer here to Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 267 (2001) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). This argument assumes that Justice Kennedy still held the views he 
expressed first in Metro Broadcasting and as late as 1996 in his majority opinion in 
Miller. Easley is only the last installment in the Shaw-Miller line of cases, which are 
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Can these disparate jurisprudential accounts be reconciled? 
One obvious explanation focuses on Justice Kennedy’s status as 
swing voter. This is a powerful argument. With Justice O’Connor 
safely occupying the swing chair, Justice Kennedy could vote his 
true preferences because his vote was not determinative to the final 
outcome in cases that mattered. It is only upon O’Connor’s 
retirement that Justice Kennedy’s views begin to shift. In this vein, 
consider what Adam Cohen wrote at the end of the Court’s 2006 
Term: 
Perhaps most important, it is not yet clear how Justice Kennedy will be 
changed by his vastly expanded influence. Justice O’Connor was very 
aware of her position as the swing justice, and it made her deeply aware of 
the impact her votes had on real people’s lives. Justice Kennedy may 
inherit that mantle of concern. It is one thing to argue in dissent that 
campaign finance laws violate the First Amendment. It is quite another to 
cast the vote that prevents a nation weary of lobbying scandals from trying
to clean up its elections.42
This same argument may be applied to Justice Kennedy’s equal 
protection jurisprudence. Once he came to the middle and the 
outcome of some of the most hotly contested policy questions hinged 
on his vote, the stakes changed. His jurisprudence changed 
accordingly. 
This is a persuasive explanation, but only to a point. Swing 
justices are often pragmatists, putting together opinions that will 
satisfy a majority of five. This is one way to explain Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter, for example, or Justice Powell’s 
opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, as 
triumphs in pragmatism. But Justice Kennedy is hardly a pragmatist, 
but an idealist. His opinions in LULAC and Parents Involved clearly 
suggest as much.43 Justice Kennedy is not looking for the lowest 
common denominator among the justices but is instead able to reach 
for the stars and write exactly the opinion he wishes to write 
unencumbered by the noise from neighboring chambers. His cultural 
                                                                                                               
grounded in a strong anti-essentialist rationale. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, 
Redistricting, and Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1185, 1194 (2007). 
42. Adam Cohen, Anthony Kennedy Is Ready for His Close-Up, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 3, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/03/opinion/03mon4.html?scp= 
10&sq=justice+kennedy+swing+vote&st=nyt. 
43. See Gerken, supra note 38, at 105. 
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worldview drives his analysis,44 as well as the particular legal domain 
under which the facts of the case arise.45
Thus the question at the heart of this Article: how to explain 
Justice Kennedy’s apparent evolution on race questions? In his early 
days on the Court, Justice Kennedy followed a narrow and 
formalistic colorblind path when interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment.46 He continued with this approach up to 2003, as seen 
in his dissent in Grutter.47 But something changed around 2006. This 
is when Kennedy became the Court’s resident super median. It is 
hardly a coincidence that his newfound voice on questions of race 
began the term after Justice O’Connor’s retirement. But that is 
precisely why domains and his cultural worldview have any bite at 
all. Once Justice Kennedy achieved super median status, he could let 
his aspirations and idealism run free, untethered by the preferences 
and idealism of others. In other words, Kennedy’s opinions are not 
those of a pragmatist because they do not have to be. This is 
attitudinalism with a vengeance. 
But this is only part of the story. As this Article explains below, 
swing justices—and particularly super medians—do not behave as 
freely and as independently as we think. This is an interesting 
paradox. The more freedom and independence a justice accrues as 
she moves towards the status of median justice, the more than public 
opinion influences her decisions. Justice Kennedy’s shift on race, in 
other words, is driven by public opinion. Thinking about Justice 
Kennedy as super median thus raises interesting questions about the 
status of public opinion and race in contemporary American society. 
Far more important than pinpointing the reasons for Kennedy’s 
newfound jurisprudential awareness are the implications of this shift. 
This Article discusses three such implications. First, Kennedy’s shift 
has direct implications for constitutional litigation and the civil rights 
bar. Litigators must learn to speak in the language that now occupies 
Justice Kennedy’s attention. Second, the shift has important 
implications for constitutional theory. The moral case against judicial 
review is powerful enough in the abstract.48 The charge becomes 
                                                     
44. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Law of Small Numbers: Gonzalez v. Carhart,
Parents Involved in Community Schools, and Some Themes from the First Full 
Term of the Roberts Court, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1369 (2008). 
45. See Gerken, supra note 38, at 107. 
46. See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke’s Fate, 43 UCLA
L. REV. 1745, 1758 (1996). 
47. Grutter v. Bolinger, 539 U.S. 306, 395 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
48. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999). 
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almost unanswerable under a prism where a singular justice is able to 
single-handedly influence the future of the most pressing policy 
questions of our generation in accordance to his particular idealism 
and cultural worldview. This is a very serious charge against the 
institution of judicial review, a charge that demands an answer. 
Finally, and in line with the previous critique, Kennedy’s shift has 
direct implications for constitutional law. This is because the end of 
the Second Reconstruction essentially hinges on the idealism and 
worldview of Justice Kennedy. This final section parses through 
Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence for clues on his thinking about this 
particular domain.  
This is a story in three Parts. Part I examines the evolving 
jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy on questions of race. Part II 
explains this evolution as a direct result of Justice Kennedy’s 
position on the Court as a super median. Finally, Part III discusses 
the three leading implications of this argument. 
I. THE EVOLVING RACE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE KENNEDY
Something is amiss in Justice Kennedy’s race jurisprudence. 
Go back to his early days on the Court, the days of City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co.,49 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,50 Presley v. 
Etowah County Commission,51 and Rice v. Cayetano,52 and you 
cannot miss the uncompromising and narrow nature of his approach 
to the use of race by the state. This is true both as a question of 
constitutional law and when interpreting federal statutes. But the 
story has begun to shift in recent years. In both LULAC and Parents
Involved, Justice Kennedy is far more nuanced and compromising in 
his approach to the use of race. These decisions cannot be reconciled 
with Kennedy’s early decisions. The Justice is clearly undergoing a 
shift in his thinking as reflected in his written opinions. This first 
Part details this shift.  
                                                     
49. 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
50. 497 U.S. 547, 631-38 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
51. 502 U.S. 491, 509-10 (1992). 
52. 528 U.S. 495, 523-24 (2000). 
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A. First Pass: City of Richmond, Metro Broadcasting, and Race 
Neutrality, 1989-2000 
In his early years on the Court, Justice Kennedy displayed a 
clear suspicion of any use of race by the state, as reflected in his 
uncompromising application of strict scrutiny across settings and 
contexts. This was true whether the governmental entity in question 
was a state, a local government, or any branch of the national 
government. This was also true even if the racial classification was 
benign in nature, designed to benefit historically underrepresented 
minorities. To Justice Kennedy, all uses of race must be catalogued 
under the same rubric, irrespective of the motive behind its 
implementation. Jim Crow laws, South African apartheid laws, and 
affirmative action policies were one and the same. Context and 
history meant nothing. 
His first pass at the question came in City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co.53 In the case, the Court considered whether a 30% racial 
set-aside policy by the Richmond city council could withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.54 This was not by any reasonable measure an 
easy case. The first obvious difficulty centered on the proper 
standard of review for laws intended to benefit members of 
underrepresented racial groups.55 The case also forced the Court to 
confront the legacy of discrimination in the South and the steps that 
state and local governments may take in compliance with the Equal 
Protection Clause to remedy this legacy.56 A final difficulty focused 
on the set-aside policy at the heart of the case.57 This was a classic 
and expected outcome of a political struggle as seen every day in 
American politics. Could the Court strike down this particular 
bargain under the guise of upholding a prior constitutional
compromise intended to bring former slaves into full citizenship 
status? 
The conservative majority on the Court had very little difficulty 
striking down the Richmond set-aside policy.58 In a lead opinion 
authored by Justice O’Connor, the Court concluded that the use of 
race by the state must be subject to strict scrutiny.59 This was true 
                                                     
53. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
54. Id. at 476-78.  
55. Id. at 493-95.  
56. Id. at 498-99.  
57. See id. at 507-08.  
58. Id. at 511.  
59. Id. at 493-95.  
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irrespective of the stated intentions of those who enacted the policies 
and regardless of the source of the policy.60 In fact, in this particular 
case, the majority found reason to be distrustful of the political body 
behind the policy because the Richmond city council had a majority-
black membership.61 Accordingly, “[t]he concern that a political 
majority will more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based 
on unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts would seem to 
militate for, not against, the application of heightened judicial 
scrutiny in this case.”62 The Court was also unpersuaded by the 
context in the case and the fact that this was an attempt by the city of 
Richmond to address its own legacy of discrimination.63 This point 
elicited a spirited response from Justice Marshall, who argued in 
dissent that:  
Our cases in the areas of school desegregation, voting rights, and 
affirmative action have demonstrated time and again that race is 
constitutionally germane, precisely because race remains dismayingly 
relevant in American life. 
In adopting its prima facie standard for States and localities, the majority 
closes its eyes to this constitutional history and social reality.64
Justice Kennedy concurred in the case, for two reasons. First, 
with Justice Scalia, he agreed that the principle of race neutrality lies 
as the moral imperative behind the command of equal protection.65
And yet, he did not sign on to Justice Scalia’s opinion, which 
adopted a bright-line rule of striking down all racial preferences that 
are not designed to remedy prior unlawful acts of racial 
discrimination.66 Instead, he wrote separately to underscore his 
agreement with Justice O’Connor’s adoption of a strict scrutiny 
test.67 He did so because he was “not convinced” that Scalia’s rigid 
test was necessary “at this point.”68 He was also “confident” that the 
                                                     
60. Id. at 500-01.  
61. Id. at 495-96.  
62. Id. (citing John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial 
Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 739 n.58 (1974) (“Of course it works both 
ways: a law that favors Blacks over Whites would be suspect if it were enacted by a 
predominantly Black legislature.”)).
63. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-99.  
64. Id. at 558 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
65. Id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
66. Id. at 518-19. 
67. Id. at 519.  
68. Id.  
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strict scrutiny test would “in application . . . operate in a manner 
generally consistent with the imperative of race neutrality.”69
There was no nuance here. There was no discussion of context 
or history or of the source for the command of racial neutrality. This 
was a simplistic, straight-forward concurrence fitting for a sixth 
grade civic class audience. Race is dangerous and toxic. It is up to 
the Court to ensure that the states use race only in the rarest of 
moments and under extenuating circumstances. 
Second, Justice Kennedy was not ready to decide whether the 
source of the challenged policy mattered for constitutional 
purposes.70 Or, in his words: 
The process by which a law that is an equal protection violation when 
enacted by a State becomes transformed to an equal protection guarantee 
when enacted by Congress poses a difficult proposition for me; but as it is 
not before us, any reconsideration of that issue must await some further 
case.71
This was an important concession. It underscores Justice Kennedy’s 
penchant for deliberate adjudication as demanded by the common 
law approach.72 But he need not wait too long to decide the question. 
The following term, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, the 
Court faced the question Justice Kennedy purposefully left open.73
The case featured a number of racial preferences adopted by the 
Federal Communications Commission and endorsed by Congress in 
the assigning or transfer of broadcasting licenses to minority-owned 
firms.74 In an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court 
surprisingly upheld the federal program as consistent with equal 
protection principles.75 The first line of the opinion spoke volumes 
about the Court’s posture in the case: “The policies before us today 
can best be understood by reference to the history of federal efforts 
to promote minority participation in the broadcasting industry.”76
Consequently, the Court held that race-conscious plans directed by 
the federal government must serve important governmental goals and 
                                                     
69. Id.  
70. Id. at 518.  
71. Id.
72. See also id. at 519 (“Nevertheless, given that a rule of automatic 
invalidity for racial preferences in almost every case would be a significant break 
with our precedents that require a case-by-case test, I am not convinced we need 
adopt it at this point.”).
73. 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990). 
74. Id. at 552, 584. 
75. Id. at 552.  
76. Id. at 552-53. 
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must be substantially related to those goals.77 The Court concluded 
that the plan in question met this standard of review.78
Justice Kennedy, in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, 
dissented.79 This is a noteworthy opinion for at least two reasons. 
First, the narrow window that Justice Kennedy appeared to leave 
open in Croson—on the question of the proper standard of review for 
race conscious plans enacted by Congress—was closed emphatically 
in Metro Broadcasting. All uses of race, whether by the federal 
government or the states, are subject to strict scrutiny. This is 
noteworthy because it offers a glimpse into Justice Kennedy’s 
approach to constitutional adjudication. It would be hard to believe 
that he would have reached a different answer to this question the 
prior term. But he did not answer the question because it was not 
properly presented.  
Second, one cannot escape the ease with which Justice 
Kennedy analogized the plan under review to the most derided cases 
and regimes of the last hundred years. His begins with Plessy and 
argues that its “standard of review and its explication have disturbing 
parallels to today’s majority opinion that should warn us something 
is amiss here.”80 In reference to the need under the policy to define 
which racial minorities are included as beneficiaries, Kennedy quotes 
Justice Stewart’s dissent in Fullilove v. Klutznick that “[i]f the 
National Government is to make a serious effort to define racial 
classes by criteria that can be administered objectively, it must study 
precedents such as the First Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship 
Law of November 14, 1935, translated in 4 Nazi Conspiracy and 
Aggression, Document No. 1417-PS, pp. 8-9 (1946).”81 Justice 
Kennedy also makes use of Korematsu v. United States and South 
Africa’s apartheid laws.82
                                                     
77. Id. at 564-65.  
78. Id. at 566.  
79. Id. at 631 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
80. Id. at 632. 
81. Id. at 633 n.1 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 n.5 
(1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). 
82. See id. at 633, 635. In response, the majority “fail[s] to understand how 
Justice KENNEDY can pretend that examples of ‘benign’ race-conscious measures 
include South African apartheid, the ‘separate-but-equal’ law at issue in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, . . . and the internment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry upheld 
in Korematsu v. United States.” Id. at 564 n.12 (majority opinion) (citations 
omitted). And more importantly, the majority is just as confident as Justice Kennedy
is not that “an examination of the legislative scheme and its history will separate 
benign measures from other types of racial classifications.” Id. (citation omitted). 
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Justice Kennedy concludes his short dissent with a passage 
worth quoting in full: 
Perhaps the Court can succeed in its assumed role of case-by-case arbiter 
of when it is desirable and benign for the Government to disfavor some 
citizens and favor others based on the color of their skin. Perhaps the 
tolerance and decency to which our people aspire will let the disfavored 
rise above hostility and the favored escape condescension. But history 
suggests much peril in this enterprise, and so the Constitution forbids us to 
undertake it. I regret that after a century of judicial opinions we interpret 
the Constitution to do no more than move us from “separate but equal” to 
“unequal but benign.”83
This passage highlights Justice Kennedy’s narrow and acontextual 
approach to the use of race by the state. Its lessons are clear. Race is 
no more than skin color. Our racial history counsels that the use of 
race poses grave dangers. And there is no such thing as benign uses 
of race. We use race as a public policy tool at our own peril. 
B. Coming into His Own: Miller’s Tale, 1993-2003 
The 1990 Census and the resulting redistricting season thrust 
the Court right in the middle of a very contentious debate over the 
role of race in politics.84 This debate presented the justices with very 
difficult questions of representation. How best to represent the 
interests of voters of color as required by the Voting Rights Act? In 
other words, how to resolve the inevitable tension between 
descriptive representation, which entailed the creation of majority-
minority districts, and substantive representation, which focused on 
the election of like-minded representatives irrespective of race? 
Complicating matters, the use of race in redistricting has clear and 
direct political consequences. This is because racial minorities—and 
particularly black voters—are generally Democratic voters. To create 
majority-minority districts is to essentially pack Democratic voters. 
It is no surprise that Republican strategists prefer these districts, 
while Democratic leaders favor the representation of interests.  
In the early 1990s, this tension reached the high court. And the 
justices failed to impress. The first case, Shaw v. Reno,85 arose out of 
                                                     
83. Id. at 637-38 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
84. Mark A. Posner, The Real Story Behind the Justice Department’s 
Implementation of Section 5 of the VRA: Vigorous Enforcement, as Intended by 
Congress, 1 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 79, 106 (2006); Joan Biskupic, N.C. 
Case to Pose Test of Racial Redistricting: White Voters Challenge Black Majority 
Map, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at A4.  
85. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
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familiar circumstances. Democratic leaders in North Carolina drew a 
state congressional map with only one majority-minority district.86
The Department of Justice (DOJ) objected to this first plan and 
demanded the creation of a second majority-minority district.87 This 
objection stemmed from the authority granted to the DOJ by the 
Voting Rights Act.88 Whether this was the proper reading of the Act 
or not, it was clear that the State of North Carolina only drew this 
second district when required to do so by federal authorities.89 But 
there were only so many Democratic voters to spread around, so in 
order to uphold the gains of the previous plan while complying with 
DOJ’s reading of the law demanded much cartographical creativity. 
In the eyes of the conservative majority on the Court, in fact, the 
resulting districts were simply bizarre, too ugly for words, and 
clearly unconstitutional. In Justice O’Connor’s words: 
[W]e believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do 
matter. A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals 
who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by 
geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common 
with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable 
resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the perception that 
members of the same racial group—regardless of their age, education, 
economic status, or the community in which they live—think alike, share 
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the 
polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible 
racial stereotypes.90
A few things jump right off from this passage. First, note the 
allusion to apartheid once again. The analogy is particularly inapt 
here, since the districts at issue were some of the most integrated 
districts in the country and a near-perfect reflection of the racial 
composition of the state as a whole.91 Second, the anti-essentialist 
impulse could not be clearer. People must be treated by the state as 
individuals and not members of groups, and they must not be 
stereotyped into roles and ascribed identities that they have not 
chosen for themselves.  
Third, it is important that the Court paid no attention to the 
context under which this case arose and the empirical realities on the 
                                                     
86. Id. at 633.  
87. Id. at 635.  
88. Id. at 634-35.  
89. Id. at 635.  
90. Id. at 647. 
91. See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court’s Voting 
Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 282. 
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ground. The fact that the state had been forced to draw the second 
district, or the fact that the pressure had come under DOJ’s particular 
reading of the Voting Rights Act, proved irrelevant. The Court 
majority had its own particular story, and it was sticking to it.  
Finally, it is crucial that the facts in Shaw did not fit traditional 
conceptions of constitutional harm in the voting rights context as 
then understood. That is, the facts fit neither vote dilution nor vote 
denial claims. This was something completely different, unless it was 
not different at all. The Court held that the use of race in redistricting 
violates equal protection principles when “a reapportionment plan 
rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to 
segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race 
without sufficient justification.”92 In so holding, the Court conceded 
that this claim was “analytically distinct”93 from traditional equal 
protection claims. The claim soon came to be known as an 
“expressive harm.”94 The reach of this inquiry, at least in 1993, 
appeared boundless.  
Soon after Shaw, it was open season on majority-minority 
districts. Or so it appeared. The question for the future was whether 
the Shaw inquiry demanded the existence of bizarre districts, as 
Justice O’Connor’s language strongly suggested. But the Court 
forged a new path in the very next case. In Miller v. Johnson, the 
Court confronted a districting scheme that resembled the traditional 
districts of old.95 The context was eerily similar: a districting plan, a 
DOJ objection, and the creation of a new majority black district.96
What this plan lacked was a bizarre district in the mold of Shaw.97 In 
an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, however, the Court 
explained that “bizarreness is [not] a necessary element of the 
constitutional wrong or a threshold requirement of proof.”98 Rather, 
shape is important “because it may be persuasive circumstantial 
evidence that race for its own sake, and not other districting 
principles, was the legislature’s dominant and controlling rationale in 
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94. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre 
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drawing its district lines.”99 This was the genesis, two years after 
Shaw, of the predominant factor test. 
In concluding, Justice Kennedy offered an ode to the anti-
essentialist principle at the heart of his opinion:100
The [Voting Rights] Act, and its grant of authority to the federal courts 
to uncover official efforts to abridge minorities’ right to vote, has been of 
vital importance in eradicating invidious discrimination from the electoral 
process and enhancing the legitimacy of our political institutions. Only if 
our political system and our society cleanse themselves of that 
discrimination will all members of the polity share an equal opportunity to 
gain public office regardless of race. As a Nation we share both the 
obligation and the aspiration of working toward this end. The end is 
neither assured nor well served, however, by carving electorates into racial 
blocs. . . . It takes a shortsighted and unauthorized view of the Voting 
Rights Act to invoke that statute, which has played a decisive role in 
redressing some of our worst forms of discrimination, to demand the very 
racial stereotyping the Fourteenth Amendment forbids.101
This conclusion is in line with Shaw in that they both share a 
disdain with race essentialism. Both opinions make clear that the 
state must not choose political identities for the voters; this is 
something that each individual voter must do for herself. Both 
opinions are also borne of an idealism that wishes to remove race 
from public life. This is true even if the facts on the ground counsel 
otherwise and irrespective of the views held by other institutional 
actors. The conservative majority holds epistemic authority on this 
question under its interpretation of the equality principle. There is no 
room for debate. 
In the next case in this long and forgettable saga, Justice 
Kennedy reinforced his formalism on questions of race and 
redistricting. The case was Bush v. Vera.102 Two particular passages 
of his concurring opinion intrigue me. The first is the passage where 
he argues that the Court “would no doubt apply strict scrutiny if a 
State decreed that certain districts had to be at least 50 percent white, 
and our analysis should be no different if the State so favors minority 
races.”103 This is an arresting sentence. To be sure, a demand that 
districts must be “at least 50 percent white” should strike us as odd 
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100. See id. at 911 (“[T]he Government must treat citizens ‘as individuals, 
not “as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.”’” (citation 
omitted)). 
101. Id. at 927-28. 
102. 517 U.S. 952 (1996). 
103. Id. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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and even bizarre. The world of race and politics as practiced in the 
United States would have to evolve dramatically for such a demand 
to make any sense at all. I cannot even begin to imagine what such a 
world would look like. This is another way of saying that context and 
history make all the difference in the world. That Justice Kennedy 
uses this passage as a way to clinch his argument that strict scrutiny 
is the obvious standard in the case tells us a great deal about his 
frame of mind on questions of race in the mid-1990s.  
The second is a passage where Justice Kennedy offers as an 
example of an unjustified racial district the notion of “gratuitous 
race-based districting.”104 This would be districting where the state 
used race for no particular reason at all. To Justice Kennedy, any use 
of race by the state unsupported by a compelling state interest is a 
“gratuitous” use of race. This is something that the state must not do. 
Without question, this is a very narrow and unforgiving 
understanding of race. It is dismissive of our racial history. But more 
importantly, it is also the law. 
C. A New Leaf: LULAC, Parents Involved, and Inclusive 
Communities Project, 2006-2015 
As late as 2003, Justice Kennedy continued to hold narrow and 
formalistic views on questions of race. In Grutter v. Bollinger, for 
example, he argued in dissent that the Michigan Law School’s
admissions plan could not survive a proper application of strict 
scrutiny.105 Echoing the spirit of earlier analogies, he wrote that 
“[p]referment by race, when resorted to by the State, can be the most 
divisive of all policies, containing within it the potential to destroy 
confidence in the Constitution and in the idea of equality.”106 This is 
a view of race as a “corrosive category,” and one where only a 
narrowly tailored policy that pursues a compelling state interest can 
meet his standard of fairness.107 Above all, as he reiterated 
throughout his dissent, his concern was that all applicants must 
receive individualized review.108 This is the same anti-essentialist 
sentiment he expressed through the years. 
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And then, beginning in 2006, something happened. Justice 
Kennedy’s views on race “softened.”109 Three cases figure 
prominently in this metamorphosis. The first case is LULAC v. 
Perry, where Justice Kennedy joined the four moderates on the Court 
and struck down a legislative district in Texas under § 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act.110 The second case is Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, where the Court 
struck down voluntary racial integration plans for the public schools 
in Louisville and Seattle.111 Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring 
opinion that looks nothing like his opinions of old. The third case is 
Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc., decided this past Term.112 This was an 
indirect challenge to the Second Reconstruction by way of disparate 
impact analysis.113 In a surprising 5–4 decision, Justice Kennedy 
interpreted the Federal Housing Act to incorporate disparate impact 
review.114 This Section examines these opinions in turn. 
1. LULAC and Latino Essentialism  
When it comes to Justice Kennedy’s views about the Voting 
Rights Act, we know two things: first, that he is deeply committed to 
an anti-essentialist reading of anti-discrimination law, and the Voting 
Rights Act lies at the core of this commitment; and second, that he is 
ambivalent about the constitutionality of the Act. Taken together, 
these two commitments make Justice Kennedy a reliable vote on the 
Court for strict, narrow, and often acontextual readings of the Act.115
This is also what makes LULAC v. Perry116 such a puzzling opinion. 
This case is worthy of attention because it appears to compromise 
both commitments. 
In LULAC, the Court faced the mid-decade Texas gerrymander 
orchestrated by Congressman Tom DeLay.117 In an opinion authored 
by Justice Kennedy, the Court struck down one of the challenged 
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districts under § 2 of the Act.118 Incidentally, this was the first time in 
the history of the Act that the Court had so held under § 2. In order to 
reach this conclusion, Justice Kennedy must face his anti-essentialist 
reading of anti-discrimination law. He must also confront his long-
standing skepticism about the constitutionality of the Voting Rights 
Act. On both of these questions, his published opinion is nothing 
short of astounding. 
Consider first the anti-essentialist critique. This is the concept 
that individuals must be treated as individuals and not as members of 
groups. Justice Kennedy is firmly within this camp, as we saw 
earlier. And yet, in LULAC, Justice Kennedy was taken by the fact 
that the Texas plan had removed Latinos from a particular district 
because they were about to achieve a numerical majority and act 
against the incumbent Republican congressman, Henry Bonilla.119
This was something that the state could not do.120 More importantly, 
Justice Kennedy’s concern was that “the State took away the 
Latinos’ opportunity because Latinos were about to exercise it.”121
That is to say, Latinos, not Democratic voters, were about to achieve 
real political power, and only then would the State step in and ensure 
their minority status. In Justice Kennedy’s words:
Even if we accept the District Court’s finding that the State’s action was 
taken primarily for political, not racial, reasons, the redrawing of the 
district lines was damaging to the Latinos in District 23. The State not 
only made fruitless the Latinos’ mobilization efforts but also acted against 
those Latinos who were becoming most politically active, dividing them 
with a district line through the middle of Laredo.122
This is a remarkable statement coming from a Justice who 
explicitly derides the essentialization of voters of color in the name 
of a particular brand of racial justice. This is the same Justice, after 
all, who wrote a decade earlier: “When the State assigns voters on 
the basis of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning 
assumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race, 
‘think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the 
same candidates at the polls.’”123 In the Shaw cases, treating 
                                                     
118. Id. at 447.  
119. Id. at 423-25.  
120. Id. at 442.  
121. Id. at 440.  
122. Id. (citation omitted). 
123. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-12 (1995) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 
509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)); see Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The perceptions of the excluded class must also be
The Racial Evolution of Justice Kennedy 1493 
Democratic voters as black voters was to engage in demeaning 
stereotyping. In LULAC, to treat Latinos as Democratic voters was a 
cognizable harm under § 2. Reconciling the tension between the old 
Justice Kennedy and the new is difficult if not downright impossible.  
One way out of this tension is apparent, yet ultimately flawed. 
In the Shaw cases, the plaintiffs argued successfully that the resulting 
shape of the majority-minority districts in question was bizarre to the 
point of unconstitutionality. As a statutory question, it could be 
argued that minority voters in North Carolina’s District 12 did not 
have a § 2 right to their district. This is because they could not meet 
all three of Thornburg v. Gingles’s factors.124 Quite obviously, they 
could not meet the first factor, the compactness requirement. The 
bizarre nature of the challenged districts made clear that black voters 
in District 12 were not “sufficiently large and geographically 
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.”125 In 
LULAC, however, Justice Kennedy concluded that Latino voters in 
the old District 23 held a § 2 right to their district. One could argue 
that this conclusion alone renders a comparison between the two 
cases inapposite.  
To so exonerate Justice Kennedy would be to miss the most 
interesting and important part of his opinion in LULAC. To be sure, 
Justice Kennedy concluded that Latinos in District 23 held a § 2 right 
to their district, a right that the legislature could not take away from 
them. But far more telling is how hard he must labor to reach this 
conclusion.126 The Chief Justice, for one, was not impressed:  
Whatever the majority believes it is fighting with its holding, it is not 
vote dilution on the basis of race or ethnicity. I do not believe it is our role 
to make judgments about which mixes of minority voters should count for 
purposes of forming a majority in an electoral district, in the face of 
factual findings that the district is an effective majority-minority 
district.127
It is downright impossible to read the Chief Justice’s dissent 
and not puzzle over what Justice Kennedy might be up to. It may 
very well be that he is intent on having a say on the clumsy and 
distasteful way in which Republicans, both in Texas and at the 
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national level, conducted themselves.128 But it is also true that 
whatever his motivations, Justice Kennedy clearly aligned himself 
with a view about race in the political context that he abhorred a 
decade before. LULAC does not square with Shaw and its progeny. 
The second point is equally baffling. Up to his controlling 
opinion in LULAC, it is hardly a stretch to consider Justice Kennedy 
a foe of the Voting Rights Act in general and racial districts in 
particular. Consider in this vein his concurring opinion in Georgia v. 
Ashcroft,129 decided in 2003: 
As is evident from the Court’s accurate description of the facts in this 
case, race was a predominant factor in drawing the lines of Georgia’s State 
Senate redistricting map. If the Court’s statement of facts had been written 
as the preface to consideration of a challenge brought under the Equal 
Protection Clause or under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a reader 
of the opinion would have had sound reason to conclude that the challenge 
would succeed. Race cannot be the predominant factor in redistricting 
under our decision in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 . . . (1995). Yet 
considerations of race that would doom a redistricting plan under the 
Fourteenth Amendment or § 2 seem to be what save it under § 5.130
These are not the words of a staunch supporter of the Act but, 
rather, the words of one who is waiting for the right moment to strike 
it down on constitutional grounds. There can be no other way if the 
predominant factor test retains any vitality. This is because any time 
§ 2 of the Act is invoked, race will predominate. This was Shaw, and 
this was also Miller. 
In LULAC, however, race predominated, and unapologetically 
so. Yet Justice Kennedy was hardly the skeptic Justice he had been 
in the recent past. Instead, no hurdle proved too difficult for him: not 
the lower court’s findings and the clear error test;131 not the actual 
words of the lower court’s opinion;132 and certainly not the 
constitutional concerns that occupied him in the past. The right of 
Latinos in District 23 to their district must be vindicated, and Justice 
Kennedy joined the moderates and happily put himself up to the task. 
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2. Parents Involved and the Legacy of Brown
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1133 offers a 
similarly telling example of Kennedy’s evolving equal protection 
views. The opinion is vintage Kennedy: School districts can use race 
in student assignments, but can only do so as a last resort.134 But 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion is far more important because it 
continues with the story of Kennedy’s transformation begun in 
LULAC. This is not the Kennedy of old, the author of narrow and 
inflexible opinions. This is a Justice willing to give complex 
constitutional questions their due care. Three arguments deserve 
close attention. 
The first argument highlights the debate within the Court over 
the legacy of Brown. Chief Justice Roberts quoted from the 
plaintiffs’ briefs in Brown that “the Fourteenth Amendment prevents 
states from according differential treatment to American children on 
the basis of their color or race.”135 He then asked, “What do the racial 
classifications at issue here do, if not accord differential treatment on 
the basis of race?”136 Justice Thomas similarly argued that “[r]acial 
imbalance is not segregation” and so the school districts in Louisville 
and Seattle are not pursuing the constitutional goals of Brown.137
With the Chief Justice, Justice Thomas wrote that the opposite is in 
fact true: The reformers in Louisville and Seattle are in the same 
moral and constitutional space as the segregationists who defended 
segregated school systems in Brown.138
The dissenters took a decidedly different view of history. 
Justice Stevens chided the Chief Justice for relying on Brown to 
strike down racial balancing plans. More specifically, he argued that 
the Chief Justice “rewrites the history of one of th[e] Court’s most 
important decisions.”139 Justice Breyer similarly wrote that:  
[I]t is a cruel distortion of history to compare Topeka, Kansas, in the 
1950’s to Louisville and Seattle in the modern day—to equate the plight of 
Linda Brown (who was ordered to attend a Jim Crow school) to the 
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circumstances of Joshua McDonald (whose request to transfer to a school 
closer to home was initially declined).140
Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence places him distinctly within 
the first camp, which views Brown and Parents Involved as morally 
equivalent. But his concurring opinion in Parents Involved betrays 
this understanding of his jurisprudence. His words could not be any 
clearer, or any more surprising: 
This is by way of preface to my respectful submission that parts of the 
opinion by THE CHIEF JUSTICE imply an all-too-unyielding insistence 
that race cannot be a factor in instances when, in my view, it may be taken 
into account. The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate 
interest government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity 
regardless of their race. The plurality’s postulate that “[t]he way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of 
race,” ante, at [40-41], is not sufficient to decide these cases. Fifty years of 
experience since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 . . . (1954), 
should teach us that the problem before us defies so easy a solution. 
School districts can seek to reach Brown’s objective of equal educational 
opportunity. The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that 
the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto 
resegregation in schooling. I cannot endorse that conclusion. To the extent 
the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and 
local school authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in 
schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.141
Justice Kennedy’s position is surprising because he is willing 
to recognize that the questions facing the Louisville and Seattle 
school boards are difficult questions, devoid of simplistic answers. 
This is a remarkable shift for a Justice who once agreed with the 
view that the creation of bizarre majority-minority districts bore an 
uncomfortable resemblance to racial apartheid.142  
The second argument looks back to the Grutter case and the 
diversity rationale. To be sure, the mere use of a prior case as settled 
law should hardly qualify as noteworthy. But Kennedy is not simply 
accepting Grutter as settled law; rather, he is reversing himself 
within the space of four years.143 Whereas in Grutter he chastised 
Justice O’Connor’s use of the diversity rationale, in Parents Involved
he suggested that “a district may consider it a compelling interest to 
achieve a diverse student population. Race may be one component of 
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that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and 
needs, should also be considered.”144 Explaining this change is not 
easy. 
The third argument focuses on what might well be the most 
influential conservative canard in history: Justice Harlan’s colorblind 
language in Plessy v. Ferguson.145 The passage reads as follows: 
“Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens.”146 Conservative jurists and commentators 
often turn to this language while criticizing affirmative action and 
similar policies as inconsistent with constitutional principles. This is 
an argument for the moral equivalence of racial segregation and 
racial integration.147 All uses of race, no matter their motives, are 
suspect and presumed unconstitutional. As Chief Justice Roberts 
wrote at the close of his opinion in Parents Involved, “The way to 
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on 
the basis of race.”148
Criticisms of this line of argument are plentiful, from diverse 
quarters.149 The one place one would not expect a critique to arise is 
Kennedy’s chambers. In Parents Involved, however, this is exactly 
what Justice Kennedy did. In his words: 
The statement by Justice Harlan that “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind”
was most certainly justified in the context of his dissent in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 . . . (1896). The Court’s decision in that case 
was a grievous error it took far too long to overrule. Plessy, of course, 
concerned official classification by race applicable to all persons who 
sought to use railway carriages. And, as an aspiration, Justice Harlan’s
axiom must command our assent. In the real world, it is regrettable to say, 
it cannot be a universal constitutional principle.150
This is a remarkable statement for any conservative jurist, and 
much more so for the jurist who penned Miller v. Johnson and who 
continually questions the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. 
                                                     
144. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
145. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
146. Id. at 559. 
147. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 773-76 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
148. Id. at 748 (plurality opinion). 
149. See Ruth Colker, Reflections on Race: The Limits of Formal Equality,
69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1089 (2008); Daniel P. Tokaji, Desegregation, Discrimination and 
Democracy: Parents Involved’s Disregard for Process, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 847 (2008). 
150. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment).  
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It is aspirational in outlook yet realist in application. This is clearly a 
different Justice Kennedy.  
3.  Inclusive Communities Project and the Vestiges of 
Residential Segregation 
The conclusion of this last Term brought us more of the same. 
In Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc., the Court considered a question that 
presaged a much larger debate about the Second Reconstruction.151 In 
a narrow sense, the Court faced a straight-forward question: Are 
disparate impact claims cognizable under the Federal Housing 
Act?152 In a 5–4 opinion, Justice Kennedy argued in the 
affirmative.153 I will have much more to say about the implications of 
this decision for the Second Reconstruction. For my purposes in this 
Subsection, I simply want to note how Justice Kennedy introduced 
the issue. This was a legal question for which history and context 
mattered. 
After the traditional recitation of facts, Kennedy turned 
immediately to the history of housing segregation in our country.154
He first offered Buchanan v. Warley, decided in 1917, which 
declared de jure housing segregation unconstitutional.155 Kennedy’s 
next move was significant; just as he recognized that housing 
segregation had been unconstitutional for almost a century, he 
conceded that its “vestiges remain today, intertwined with the 
country’s economic and social life.”156 This was due “to conditions 
that arose in the mid-20th century,” including “[r]apid urbanization”
and the resulting white flight to the suburbs.157 Notably, the 
government was no mere bystander in all of this: 
During this time, various practices were followed, sometimes with 
governmental support, to encourage and maintain the separation of the 
races: Racially restrictive covenants prevented the conveyance of property 
to minorities; steering by real-estate agents led potential buyers to consider 
homes in racially homogenous areas; and discriminatory lending practices, 
                                                     
151. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2510 (2015).  
152. Id.  
153. See id.  
154. Id. at 2515.  
155. 245 U.S. 60, 71, 82 (1917). 
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often referred to as redlining, precluded minority families from purchasing 
homes in affluent areas.158
In due time, these practices led to their expected result. “By the 
1960’s,” Justice Kennedy recognized, “these policies, practices, and 
prejudices had created many predominantly black inner cities 
surrounded by mostly white suburbs.”159
President Johnson responded to the “considerable social 
unrest” by establishing the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders, better known as the Kerner Commission.160 Kennedy 
quoted the Commission’s report, including its conclusion that “[o]ur 
Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—
separate and unequal.”161 He also quoted its recommendation about 
the need for “a comprehensive and enforceable open-occupancy law 
making it an offense to discriminate in the sale or rental of any 
housing . . . on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin.”162
In the wake of Dr. King’s assassination, Congress responded by 
enacting the Commission’s recommendations, codified in the Fair 
Housing Act.163
Think about Justice Kennedy through the years, and 
particularly his uncompromising stance on questions of race. The 
early cases made no use of history or context. Plessy is Korematsu is 
Brown is Grutter. The use of race by the state was noxious and even 
dangerous. Racial classifications may be used only under extreme 
circumstances. His cites in this context to the First Regulation to the 
Reichs Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935, and South Africa’s
apartheid laws are jarring. Beginning in 2006, however, his views 
began to soften. This leads me directly to the question of the next 
Part: How to explain this metamorphosis? 
II. KENNEDY IN THE MIDDLE: THE FACE OF A SUPER MEDIAN
Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence is undergoing a radical 
transformation. From his early years on the Court and up until his 
dissenting opinion in Grutter, decided in 2003, Justice Kennedy 
could not be considered a friend of the civil rights community. But 
                                                     
158. Id. (citation omitted).  
159. Id. (citing KENNETH B. CLARK, DARK GHETTO: DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL 
POWER 11, 21-26 (1965)). 
160. Id. at 2516.  
161. Id.  
162. Id.  
163. Id.  
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things are clearly different, as argued in the previous Part. This Part 
explains the shift in relation to Kennedy’s status as a super median.
A. What’s in a Super Median? 
The concept of swing—or median—justice is well ingrained in 
our political consciousness. This is the one justice in the Court’s 
ideological middle, the one vote that decides all the important and 
contested cases. Justice O’Connor was widely seen as a swing voter 
throughout her years on the Court, and so was Justice Powell.164 In 
recent years, and particularly since Justice O’Connor’s retirement, 
Justice Kennedy is now widely considered the Court’s swing 
Justice.165
But not all medians are the same. Consider the fact that Justices 
Marshall, Blackmun, and Souter could be considered at one time or 
another to have been the Court’s median justices.166 Differences in 
the power and influence of median justices are captured by the term 
“super median.”167 Super medians are those swing justices “who (1) 
are crucial to the formation of majority coalitions and, thus, to the
outcome of any given decision and (2) are influential in dictating the 
terms of the Court’s opinion and, thus, to the formulation of any 
precedent it establishes, especially in consequential or otherwise 
high-profile decisions.”168 In order for a swing justice to achieve the 
status of super median, she must be a consistent member of the 
majority coalition, and she must also be influential within that 
coalition. Put differently, the status of super median is “a function of 
the relative proximity between the swing justice and those nearest to 
him or her.”169
A justice becomes a super median when two conditions are 
met. First, the ideological gap between the median justice and the 
justices to her left and to her right on the Court’s ideological 
continuum grows, so that it is less likely it is that majority opinions 
                                                     
164. Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 16, at 55. 
165. See David Cole, The ‘Kennedy Court,’ THE NATION (July 31, 2006), 
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167. Id. at 40-41.  
168. Id. at 51. 
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can be formed without the median voter.170 And second, the 
“overlap” in the distribution of the preferences of the median justice 
and the closest justices decrease.171 As the justices’ preferences 
converge, the more likely it is that majority coalitions can form 
without the median.172 This is exactly what happens to Justice Souter, 
the median Justice during the 1991 Term.173 In contrast, as the 
preference distributions diverge, it is less likely that majority 
coalitions can form without the swing justice.174 This is Justice 
O’Connor in 2001.175 This is also Justice Kennedy in 2006,176 the 
Term when the Court decided Parents Involved.  
Notably, research suggests that the median swing justice, that 
is, “the Justice in the middle of a distribution of Justices,”177 is less 
driven by ideology than other justices and more by “strategic and 
case-specific considerations.”178 More importantly, these justices’
votes “correspond more closely with public opinion and less with 
personal preferences than the other justices.”179 This finding reminds 
me of a cautionary note issued by then-Justice Rehnquist over a 
generation ago: 
The judges of any court of last resort, such as the Supreme Court of the 
United States, work in an insulated atmosphere in their courthouse where 
they sit on the bench hearing oral arguments or sit in their chambers 
writing opinions. But these same judges go home at night and read the 
newspapers or watch the evening news on television; they talk to their 
family and friends about current events. Somewhere “out there”—beyond 
the walls of the courthouse—run currents and tides of public opinion 
which lap at the courthouse door. . . . [I]f these tides of public opinion are 
sufficiently great and sufficiently sustained, they will very likely have an 
effect upon the decision of some of the cases decided within the 
courthouse. . . . Judges, so long as they are relatively normal human 
                                                     
170. Id. at 74.  
171. Id. at 81. 
172. Id. at 83.  
173. Id.  
174. Id. at 85.  
175. Id. at 85, 87.  
176. Epstein and Jacobi identify six super medians beginning in 1953. These 
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179. Id. at 1103. 
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beings, can no more escape being influenced by public opinion in the long 
run than can people working at other jobs.180
Chief Justice Rehnquist concedes that judges must be 
influenced by public opinion. Researchers generally agree with this 
conclusion.181
More crucially, recent work concludes that in the closely 
divided cases, “a significant relationship” only exists between the 
preferences of the public and the justice casting the deciding vote.182
In other words, public opinion influences the Court’s median. And 
therein lies the key to solving the puzzle of Justice Kennedy’s 
curious metamorphosis. 
B. Justice Kennedy as Super Median 
Constitutional law is whatever the super median says it is, 
particularly for the close cases. This is a remarkable power. Writing 
in reference to the 2010 Term, Noah Feldman explained: 
It is Kennedy’s apparent unpredictability -- and his willingness to make 
common cause with both factions in different cases -- that is the source of 
his overwhelming power in court and country. This year, there have been 
nine 5-4 cases; Kennedy has been in the majority every time. (Last year he 
was the controlling vote in 12 of 17 cases decided 5-4; the previous year 
20 out of 25.)183
This description neatly encapsulates Kennedy’s status on the 
Court. Justice Kennedy’s “unpredictability” is reflected in a wider 
preference distribution, which allows him to move among coalitions 
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182. See Enns & Wohlfarth, supra note 178, at 1103-04.
183. Feldman, supra note 1. 
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within the Court with relative ease. He is part of most narrow 
majority coalitions because the gap between his ideological 
preferences and those of the justices on either side of him is wide.184
That is the source of Kennedy’s power and influence. 
This is true of the recently completed 2014 Term.185 Looking 
over the course of the Term, the measure of Justice Kennedy’s 
influence appears muted. He was on the majority of the Court in 88% 
of cases decided.186 Justice Breyer led the Court with 92%, and 
Justice Sotomayor came in second at 89%.187 If we look only at the 
divided cases, Justice Kennedy was in the majority 80% of the time; 
Justice Breyer also led the Court here, at 86%, and Justice 
Sotomayor was second at 82%.188 But his influence grows if we look 
only at the closely divided cases, the 5–4 cases. These are the 
difficult cases where the Court often divides along ideological lines, 
and where the super medians put their influence to use. Out of 
nineteen such cases, Justice Kennedy was in the majority fourteen 
times, or 74% percent.189 More tellingly, he joined the four 
conservative Justices in five 5–4 decisions, and the moderate Justices 
in eight of these cases.190 This is true of Justice Kennedy through the 
years, his ability to coalesce with both conservative and moderate 
coalitions.191
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1504 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1473 
These nineteen cases do not describe the full measure of his 
influence. Far more important are the major cases of the Term, what 
Bradley Canon terms the “politico-moral” cases.192 There were 
fourteen major cases.193 Justice Kennedy joined the majority in 
twelve of these cases and, interestingly, so did Justice Breyer.194 But 
a closer look at the four cases where they disagreed tells an 
important story. Notably, all four were 5–4 decisions.195 In two of 
them, Horne v. Department of Agriculture (the California raisin 
growers case)196 and Glossip v. Gross (the Oklahoma lethal injection 
protocol case),197 the Court followed the classic liberal–conservative 
split.198 In the other two cases, Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar (a state 
ban on campaign funds for judges)199 and Walker v. Texas Division, 
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. (the confederate flag on license 
plates case),200 a conservative justice joined the moderate wing of the 
Court.201 In other words, it took two defections from conservative 
justices (Justice Thomas in the confederate flag case and the Chief 
Justice in the campaign finance case) for Justice Breyer to match 
Justice Kennedy. Had the classic ideological lines held, Justice 
Kennedy would have been in the majority in every major closely 
divided case. Also, while Justice Breyer did not join the conservative 
wing of the Court in any closely divided case, Justice Kennedy 
joined the moderate wing five times, and with the Chief Justice, 
joined the moderates in King v. Burwell, the health care decision.202
This is one easy way to explain Justice Kennedy’s apparent 
jurisprudential evolution. Justice Kennedy’s views are changing 
because they can, because his status as super median allows him to 
do so. When Justice Kennedy wrote his majority opinion in Miller,
for example, he did so from a position of weakness, in that he needed 
to preserve Justice O’Connor’s vote within the five-member 
majority. The following year, in Bush v. Vera, Justice O’Connor left 
no doubt about the centrality of her views in this area, as she both 
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wrote a majority opinion for the Court as well as a concurrence to 
her own majority.203 Upon Justice O’Connor’s retirement, Justice 
Kennedy could finally assert his own views. This is when we see 
LULAC, decided the Term following O’Connor’s retirement. 
In order to appreciate the true nature of Justice Kennedy’s 
status on the Court, and his ability to coalesce with both conservative 
and moderate coalitions, consider the following graph:204
Note first how much the Court tilted to the right up until the 
time of Justice O’Connor’s retirement. Even those years when 
Justice Kennedy or Justice O’Connor was considered a super 
median, they joined their moderate colleagues in a very low 
percentage of cases. In the 2005 Term, for example, O’Connor 
joined her moderate colleagues in approximately 15% of the 5–4
cases, and Justice Kennedy joined his moderate colleagues 
approximately 10% of the time in the 1996 Term. There are spikes in 
the graph, to be sure—note specifically Justice Kennedy’s 1997 
Term and O’Connor’s 2002 Term—but these are exceptions to the 
general voting trend.  
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The real story of this graph is the dramatic change seen in 
Justice Kennedy. The first major change happens around the time of 
Justice O’Connor’s retirement. He went from joining no opinions 
with his moderate colleagues during the 2001 and 2002 Terms to 
joining them in 25% of the 5–4 decisions. This last Term, Kennedy 
joined them in 42% of these cases. And more remarkable still, the 
number of closely divided cases he joined with his conservative 
colleagues dipped in turn. This past Term, in fact, he joined them 
26% of the time. The evolution in Justice Kennedy’s behavior on the 
Court is clear. It corroborates the insight that super medians may be 
as flexible and inconsistent as they wish to be. In fact, to be a super 
median means precisely that, the independence to join one’s 
colleagues as needed. In Justice Kennedy’s case, it demonstrates the 
ability to adapt in order to remain in control of the Court’s decision-
making. This is LULAC. This is also Parents Involved.
As a super median, Justice Kennedy enjoys much freedom to 
expound on his particular constitutional vision. Super medians can 
do as they wish because any winning coalition must include their 
votes in the final tally. This is where idiosyncratic legal theories take 
hold and unorthodox readings of legal texts receive an honest 
hearing. According to his critics, this is a fit description of Justice 
Kennedy. As Feldman writes, “Justice Kennedy is different. His 
opinions tend to be grounded on strong statements of principle. Yet 
many find his tacking from right to left mystifying, frustrating and 
unpredictable. They question what consistent principles could guide 
such apparently disparate conclusions, and hint darkly at incoherence 
or self-aggrandizement.”205 This is one way to explain Justice 
Kennedy’s shift: as a reflection of the independence afforded by his 
status as super median. The argument of the previous section 
complicates matters a bit.
I agree with Lyle Denniston that Justice Kennedy “is the virtual 
embodiment of the tendencies of the Roberts Court.”206 I might also 
agree, to a point, with Noah Feldman when he writes that this is 
“Justice Anthony Kennedy’s country -- the rest of us just live in 
it.”207 Once we consider that public opinion is keenly felt on the 
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swing justice, however, these statements take on a different light. 
Justice Kennedy’s apparent metamorphosis on questions of race is a 
reflection of the conflicted way that public opinion views these 
questions. These are not easy questions. Justice Kennedy’s evolving 
views are implicitly recognizing that fact. 
III. WHY IT MATTERS: LAW, THEORY, AND THE FATE OF THE 
SECOND RECONSTRUCTION
As a super median, Justice Kennedy is free and independent to 
decide cases as idiosyncratically as he wishes to decide them, subject 
to the constraints of public opinion. This is why we witness a shift in 
his views on race, from an uncompromising stance in his early years 
on the Court and through 2003, to a more flexible and contextual 
approach beginning around 2006. The implications of this shift are 
far-reaching. The implications for constitutional litigation are 
obvious: For the politico-moral cases,208 those cases that grab the 
public’s attention and energize the culture wars, the vote of Justice 
Kennedy is crucial. Such is the life of a super median. In turn, the 
implications for constitutional theory directly follow; this is the 
countermajoritarian difficulty on steroids. Is it possible to defend the 
notion that a single justice can determine some of the most important 
constitutional questions of his generation? The final Section 
examines the implications of this question for constitutional law 
generally and, in so doing, makes this abstract question more 
concrete. This is the question of the constitutionality of the Voting 
Rights Act, the “crown jewel” of the civil rights movement. Is the 
constitutionality of the Act in the hands of Justice Kennedy? 
Assuming that Justice Kennedy retains his status as super median, so 
that he remains independent to consult his newfound domains 
jurisprudence, how is he likely to answer this question? 
A. Constitutional Litigation 
Justice Kennedy’s status as super median has obvious 
implications for constitutional litigation. As the one justice whose 
vote must form part of any majority coalition, litigators must pay 
undue attention to Justice Kennedy’s preferences. This makes for 
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challenging strategizing. Justice Kennedy’s wide preference 
distribution—his known “unpredictability”—makes the task of 
predicting his vote difficult. But there are clues. 
The first basic step is to focus on the “constitutional domain”209
in question. Context matters. On this view, LULAC was not a case 
about Latinos and their nascent political power but, rather, about the 
First Amendment, political agency, and expression. Similarly, “[j]ury 
service is an exercise of responsible citizenship by all members of 
the community, including those who otherwise might not have the 
opportunity to contribute to our civic life.”210 Even when peremptory 
challenges are used by private litigants, though protecting a private 
interest, “the objective of jury selection proceedings is to determine 
representation on a governmental body.”211 And in Lee v. Weisman,
which involved the deliverance by a rabbi of prayer during a high 
school graduation ceremony,212 Justice Kennedy described the event 
as follows: 
Graduation is a time for family and those closest to the student to celebrate 
success and express mutual wishes of gratitude and respect, all to the end 
of impressing upon the young person the role that it is his or her right and 
duty to assume in the community and all of its diverse parts.213
To the answer that a student is always free to miss the 
graduation ceremony, and so no coercion is involved by the state, 
Justice Kennedy responded that “[l]aw reaches past formalism. And 
to say a teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high 
school graduation is formalistic in the extreme. . . . Everyone knows 
that in our society and in our culture high school graduation is one of 
life’s most significant occasions.”214 The similarity in the analysis to 
Parents Involved and LULAC is unmistakable.  
Whether public schools, questions of political association and 
identity, or prison reform, Justice Kennedy is moved and influenced 
by “strategic and case-specific considerations.”215 This is precisely 
how median justices behave. What we see from Justice Kennedy is 
in line with the way researchers understand the median justice. 
The next step is more challenging. Once a particular domain is 
identified, litigators must try to assess the proper principles that 
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govern the particular domain.216 Professor Gerken identifies the 
principles that govern the public school and political association 
domains in Justice Kennedy’s constitutional world.217 But she does so 
by cobbling together bits and pieces from Justice Kennedy’s written 
opinions.218 It is much harder to identify similar principles without 
the benefit of Kennedy’s written accounts. Looking to the future, the 
task is to identify what those principles may be. I discuss three 
leading principles.219
The first principle—and here Justice Kennedy is channeling his 
inner-Brennan and Walter Murphy220—is the concept of human 
dignity.221 In the recent Brown v. Plata, the California prison case,222
Justice Kennedy wrote for a sharply divided Court that “[p]risoners 
retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons. Respect 
for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment.”223 Justice Kennedy has deployed this 
argument in myriad cases and contexts, from the anti-sodomy 
statutes in Lawrence v. Texas224 and the abortion laws in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey225 to 
congressional restrictions on partial-birth abortions226 and even suits 
against states in state courts for money damages, even when the 
states have broken federal law.227 This is also true, more recently, in 
Shelby County v. Holder, a moment in the Court’s history when the 
conservative majority let its imagination run free, striking down 
important portions of a super-statute under the guise of state dignity 
and an imagined “equality of States” doctrine.228 The lesson is clear: 
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223. Id. at 1928. 
224. See 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
225. See 505 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1992). 
226. See Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (noting that the 
congressional ban “expresse[d] respect for the dignity of human life”).
227. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 711-12, 749 (1999). 
228. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 10, at 483-84, 484 n.9 
(2014) (citation omitted); Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 175, 175-76 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1174_iyst6fvo.pdf. 
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“Anyone who wants to win his vote would do well to argue that 
someone’s dignity is being violated somewhere.”229
The second principle is the jealous protection of the authority 
of the judiciary to interpret the Constitution.230 Justice Kennedy is 
clearly a judicial supremacist, and this is true across myriad settings 
and contexts. The classic exposition of this principle appears in City 
of Boerne v. Flores, a case where Kennedy appeared miffed that 
Congress had attempted to overrule a judicial interpretation of a 
substantive constitutional provision.231 According to Kennedy, this 
principle dated as far back as the founding and the canonical 
Marbury v. Madison.232 This was something Congress could not 
do.233 The principle was also present in Plata; Kennedy’s opinion for 
the Court came only after years of litigation and the disregard by 
state prison officials of court orders demanding prison reform.234 This 
is also the wrongful districting cases,235 and particularly Miller v. 
Johnson, a case where the Court worries that the DOJ is interpreting 
the Voting Rights Act unconstitutionally.236 Justice Kennedy and his 
brethren make clear that the Court is in charge of constitutional 
questions.237
This is a marked change from the Court’s posture dating to the 
time of the Warren Court. Then, the Court happily deferred to the 
political branches on questions of congressional powers.238 This is 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach;239 this is also Katzenbach v. 
Morgan.240 As Shelby County makes clear, this is not the 
conservative wing of the Roberts Court. 
                                                     
229. See Feldman, supra note 1. 
230. See id.  
231. 521 U.S. 507, 514-15, 519 (1997). 
232. Id. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803)).  
233. See id. at 519. 
234. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922-23 (2011).  
235. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Pamela S. Karlan, Our 
Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 83, 90-91. 
236. 515 U.S. 900, 903, 905-06 (1995). 
237. See id. at 912.  
238. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Understanding the Paradoxical Case of the 
Voting Rights Act, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 715 (2009).  
239. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).  
240. 384 U.S. 641 (1966); see Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, 
The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV.
1389, 1401-02 (2015); see also Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 238, at 715-16 (“The 
Morgan case must be understood for what it was: a moment in time when the Court 
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A third principle is a healthy, if selective, distrust of the 
political branches and the lengths to which they will go to protect 
themselves.241 This principle is straight out of the political process 
school. This is an important part of the story in Bush v. Gore, as the 
Court worries about a rogue state court changing the rules of the 
game in order to elect the state court’s preferred candidate.242 This is 
also LULAC, a case best explained as a reaction to the process by 
which Texas sought to change the rules of the game mid-census.243
More recently, this is Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission, which upheld Arizona’s 
ballot initiative establishing an independent congressional 
redistricting commission in the face of contrary constitutional 
language under the Elections Clause.244 And similarly, this is also 
Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, a challenge to the 
state’s reapportionment plan.245 This case reminds me of LULAC in 
reference to Justice Kennedy’s vote. The majority appears to go out 
of its way to decide this case, in the face of what the principal dissent 
considers to be insurmountable procedural obstacles.246
There are limits to this distrust, of course. The easiest case for 
judicial intervention as a political process question might be the 
political gerrymandering arena. This is an area where politicians get 
away with a lot, yet the Court refuses to intervene, feigning an 
inability to discern judicially manageable standards. Justice Kennedy 
holds the controlling vote here. He is yet to find such a standard and 
is still in search of a surgical approach to the area, akin to the Court’s 
intervention in the one person, one vote revolution. Justice Kennedy 
misunderstands this history, for the Court was not as surgical and 
modest as he might think; at different times, the Court declared 
almost all state legislatures and the United States House of 
Representatives unconstitutional.247 This is not the behavior of a 
                                                                                                               
ceded some of its traditional power to define the substantive scope of the 
Constitution to Congress and its own power to enforce the Constitution.”).
241. See Feldman, supra note 1.
242. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
243. See Charles, supra note 41. 
244. 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2015). 
245. 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015). 
246. Id. at 1275 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
247. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 20 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(“I had not expected to witness the day when the Supreme Court of the United States 
would render a decision which casts grave doubt on the constitutionality of the 
composition of the House of Representatives.”); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. 
Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 746 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
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modest and passive institution. Also, the reapportionment revolution 
leads inexorably from the equipopulation cases to the political 
gerrymandering cases. They are two sides of the same coin. More 
importantly as an institutional question, if the Court is able and 
willing to regulate the redistricting arena in the name of 
representative fairness, or campaign finance regulation—which is yet 
another example of distrust of the political branches—the Court 
could certainly handle the political gerrymandering area. But that’s 
an argument for another day. 
Looking ahead, the lessons of this argument are both clear and 
unsurprising: Litigants must pay close attention to Justice Kennedy’s 
particularities and subtleties. It matters whether the issue is voluntary 
school integration plans or political gerrymandering, prison reform 
or the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, and it also matters 
how Kennedy interprets these various contexts. This is hardly news. 
Far more interesting and important are the implications of this 
argument for constitutional theory and the Bickelian challenge. This 
is the subject of the next Section. 
B. Constitutional Theory and the Bickelian Challenge 
Writing in the early 1960s, and undoubtedly influenced by the 
perceived excesses of the Warren Court, Alexander Bickel offered 
his influential charge against the institution of judicial review.248 This 
was the famed “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”249 In his words: 
[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or 
the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of 
the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of 
the prevailing majority, but against it. This, without mystic overtones, is 
what actually happens. . . . [I]t is the reason the charge can be made that 
judicial review is undemocratic.250
                                                                                                               
Reynolds and its companion cases for declaring “unconstitutional the legislatures of 
most of the 50 States”).
248. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (Vail-Ballou Press, Inc., 2d ed. 1986) 
(1962).  
249. Id. at 16-17.
250. Id.; HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS
55 (1958) (“Whatever the logical support for the theory [of judicial review], it 
cannot be found in the philosophy of democracy if by democracy we mean majority 
rule; whatever the practical justification, it cannot be found in the defense of 
fundamental rights against the assault of misguided or desperate majorities.”).
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The claim is ultimately about accountability and democratic 
pedigree. Supreme Court justices are unelected political actors, 
granted life tenure in order to render them independent by design. 
Their democratic pedigree is decidedly low. In contrast, the 
democratic pedigree of elected officials is concomitantly high. They 
are accountable to the electorate and must be cognizant of public 
opinions or else face the consequences in the next election.  
Whatever one thinks about the straight-forward simplicity of 
the argument, it remains true that Bickel’s charge dominated 
constitutional scholarship almost from the time that Bickel issued his 
challenge.251 Some argue that it still does.252 The response, in fact, is 
said to border on an “obsession.”253
As a general matter, the claim is not terribly interesting, nor is 
it descriptively accurate. For all the noise that surrounds Bickel’s 
famed difficulty, it is still true that the Court is seldom out of step 
with public opinion for long.254 The appointment process ensures as 
                                                     
251. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries 
and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 712 (1995) (“[R]esponding to the 
countermajoritarian difficulty has been an important staple on the menu of 
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Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE 
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supra, at 712 n.66 (documenting some of the many published acknowledgments to
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252. See Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever by Half: The Problem with Novelty in 
Constitutional Law, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 921, 921 (2001) (“[T]he ‘counter-
majoritarian difficulty’ remains—some forty years after its christening—a central 
theme in constitutional scholarship. Indeed, one might say that reconciling judicial 
review and democratic institutions is the goal of almost every major constitutional 
scholar writing today . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
253. See Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts 
to Congress to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361, 380 (2008); 
Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002). 
254. See, e.g., David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: 
Judicial Decision Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. POL. 652, 662 (1985) 
(“[T]he judicial activism of the post-New Deal Supreme Court was in fact 
surprisingly consistent with majoritarian principles.”); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-
Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB.
L. 279, 285 (1957) (“The fact is, then, that the policy views dominant on the Court 
are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking 
majorities of the United States.”). See generally THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC 
OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989); Flemming & Wood, supra note 181;
Michael W. Link, Tracking Public Mood in the Supreme Court: Cross-Time 
Analyses of Criminal Procedure and Civil Rights Cases, 48 POL. RES. Q. 61 (1995); 
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much.255 To be sure, the Court is not a majoritarian institution in 
every case,256 but this is hardly an indictment on the institution. The 
fact that the Court can stand against public opinion is an interesting 
question in its own right, but that is not the question that Bickel 
asked.257
For my purposes, the example of Justice Kennedy as super 
median indicts the institution of judicial review in a far more 
important and revealing way. It is hard enough to justify as a 
normative matter—though not impossible—granting the Supreme 
Court the power to overrule the present wishes of elected officials on 
the basis of vague and imprecise constitutional language. Bickel got 
this much right. But could anyone defend granting one justice the 
power to decide some of the most difficult and contested questions of 
public policy in a country of well over 300 million people? Put 
differently, how does one defend Justice Kennedy’s role on the Court 
as super median? 
This is an arresting claim. Consider in this vein Justice 
Kennedy’s recent shift on questions of race. This Article argues that 
the best way to explain it is by looking to Kennedy’s newfound 
status as super median, which in turn allowed him to contextualize 
                                                                                                               
William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a 
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court 
Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87 (1993); James A. Stimson, Michael B. 
Mackuen & Robert S. Erikson, Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 543 
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Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 609 (1993) (“[C]ontrary to 
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decisions often are majoritarian.”); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights 
and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (“The Supreme Court 
does not play the strong countermajoritarian role in defense of individual liberties 
that popular wisdom ascribes to it.”).
255. See Dahl, supra note 254, at 284-85. See generally GLENDON 
SCHUBERT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITY (1970); Norpoth & Segal, supra note 181;
Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Change on the Supreme Court: Examining Alternative 
Models, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 461 (1985). Influential legal scholars agree. See, e.g.,
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) 
(“If the Courts are free to write the Constitution anew, they will, by God, write it the 
way the majority wants; the appointment and confirmation process will see to 
that.”).
256. See MARSHALL, supra note 254, at 55. 
257. For a recent revitalization of the Bickelian challenge as a moral claim, 
see Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010
SUP. CT. REV. 103. 
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his jurisprudence accordingly in domain-like fashion. Justice 
Kennedy is now able to explore his views about public schools, the 
crafting of district lines as politically associative practices protected 
by the First Amendment, or the role that the concept of human 
dignity must play in decision-making. The Constitution is whatever 
Justice Kennedy says it is, irrespective of text, history, precedent, or 
even Justice Kennedy’s own views on the matter.258 It is a brave new 
world, but that is precisely the world of the super median.  
This is a remarkable power. It is also unjustifiable. Justice 
Kennedy’s position on the Court, and his recent shift, offer an 
inimitable example of attitudinalist jurisprudence and its perils. To 
see more clearly the implications of this view, the next Section turns 
to a more concrete example. This is the ongoing debate over the 
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. 
C. Constitutional Law and the Challenge to the Second 
Reconstruction 
To this day, the Voting Rights Act stands as the clearest 
example of our national commitment to eradicating racial 
discrimination from the political process. The problem at hand had 
proven quite difficult, even intractable. Dating back to the late 
nineteenth century, jurisdictions throughout the South 
institutionalized the mass disenfranchisement of otherwise eligible 
black voters.259 This condition endured unabated for well over half a 
century. When Congress finally faced up to the problem, it could 
only do so from a position of weakness so long as southern 
congressmen held together. The resulting legislation—the Civil 
Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964—reflected this weakness. The 
best the legislation could do was open up the federal courts to 
adjudicate claims of racial discrimination in voting. But such a 
response proved no match for the ingenuity and recalcitrance of 
defiant southern jurisdictions. A stronger response was needed. 
This was the Voting Rights Act of 1965.260 The success of the 
Act can be attributed to the fact that it radically shifted basic legal 
                                                     
258. In saying this, I do not intend to suggest that the relevant publics 
acquiesce to whatever the Court chooses to impose on them. The question of judicial 
impact is far more complicated than that, yet underappreciated.  
259. See generally J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN 
POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY 
SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974). 
260. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.  
1516 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1473 
burdens and presumptions. Under prior law, the federal government 
must come to local courts and carry its burden of showing the 
unconstitutionality of the laws under review. In other words, the laws 
were presumed constitutional unless and until the federal 
government could prove otherwise in open court. Under the Voting 
Rights Act, however, any voting law enacted by jurisdictions 
covered by § 4 of the Act is presumed to be unconstitutional until the 
federal government determines otherwise.261 These covered 
jurisdictions were also subject to the appointment of poll watchers 
and voting registrars. No longer would the voting rights of voters of 
color be subject to the whims of local registrars and state and local 
governments. 
Almost as soon as President Johnson signed the bill into law, 
South Carolina challenged the constitutionality of the new law. 
Unremarkably, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court 
sided with the overwhelming national coalition that supported the 
law.262 In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren, the Court 
concluded that the Act was a rational response to a problem that had 
plagued the country for generations.263 The Court was deferring to 
congressional wishes, to be sure, but this was no run-of-the-mill 
rationality review. Having myriad testimony and congressional 
findings at its disposal, the Court made use of them all, as if to 
justify the aggressive nature of the new law.264 This approach to 
constitutional review did not sit well with Justice Brennan.265 In notes 
he wrote to the Chief Justice on the margins of the first circulated 
draft of the opinion, Brennan questioned the need to include any 
reference to legislative findings in the opinion.266 Justice Brennan 
was looking to the future. To be sure, the record in support of the 
Voting Rights Act was robust and exemplary. He knew that the 
Court would not always have access to such a record. 
History has borne out Brennan’s critique. In the very next 
case—Katzenbach v. Morgan267—the Court faced a similarly difficult 
                                                     
261. § 4, 79 Stat. at 438.  
262. 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966). 
263. Id.  
264. See id. at 308-09.  
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constitutional question: Assuming the constitutionality of the literacy 
test,268 could Congress prohibit the denial of the right to vote to a 
person who completed a sixth-grade education in Puerto Rico 
(presumably an education in Spanish) due to her inability to read or 
write English?269 The answer could not be clearer: Congress could 
presumably not do so unless it could show, as in South Carolina, that 
the state law was racially discriminatory.270 But there was only one 
problem, which Justice Harlan was happy to point out in dissent: 
Congress had proffered no findings in support of this provision.271
Not a one. This was nothing more than a “legislative announcement” 
that the law in question violated equal protection principles.272 In 
writing the opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan must thus rely on 
traditional rational basis review, the kind that places few if any 
demands on legislatures. And that is precisely what he did. In the 
face of a barren record, he wrote, for example, that “§ 4(e) may be 
viewed as a measure to secure for the Puerto Rican community 
residing in New York nondiscriminatory treatment by government—
both in the imposition of voting qualifications and the provision or 
administration of governmental services, such as public schools, 
public housing and law enforcement.”273 The Court was not about to 
engage in a review of a non-existent record, so it was left to argue 
that “[i]t is not for us to review the congressional resolution of these 
factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which 
the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.”274 This was 
rationality “review” by name only. 
Justice Brennan’s concerns took on added significance through 
the years. While upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the Court 
would often highlight facts on the record to support its decision. In 
City of Rome v. United States,275 for example, the Court offered the 
following: 
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1518 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1473 
In considering the 1975 extension, Congress acknowledged that largely 
as a result of the Act, Negro voter registration had improved dramatically 
since 1965. Congress determined, however, that “a bleaker side of the 
picture yet exists.” Significant disparity persisted between the percentages 
of whites and Negroes registered in at least several of the covered 
jurisdictions. In addition, though the number of Negro elected officials had 
increased since 1965, most held only relatively minor positions, none held 
statewide office, and their number in the state legislatures fell far short of 
being representative of the number of Negroes residing in the covered 
jurisdictions. Congress concluded that, because minority political progress 
under the Act, though “undeniable,” had been “modest and spotty,”
extension of the Act was warranted.276
This is now an accepted axiom in our constitutional law, that 
Congress’s enforcement powers must be exercised only when 
supported by an adequate record. This is the central teaching of City 
of Boerne v. Flores.277 But to suggest that this requirement began 
with City of Boerne is to be blind to the lessons of history. Justice 
Brennan could foresee this outcome a generation before. 
This is where we find ourselves today. In Shelby County, the 
Court began the expected dismantling of the Voting Rights Act. The 
case exalted the indignity of subjecting the covered jurisdictions—
and only the covered jurisdictions—to the Act’s preclearance 
regime.278 With preclearance essentially out of the way, the next step 
was obvious: § 2 of the Act, which enforces the substantive core of 
the Fifteenth Amendment through a disparate impact test. This is a 
difficult question because the Court has interpreted the substantive 
provisions of that Amendment as enshrining an intent test. This 
would be a challenge to the constitutionality of the Second 
Reconstruction more generally, as myriad statutes enforce the 
substantive component of the Reconstruction Amendments with a 
disparate impact analysis. A related question will look for answers to 
Justice Scalia’s challenge: Is the effort by state and private actors to 
avoid disparate impact liability in itself a species of discrimination 
actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equality principle?279
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And then came Inclusive Communities Project. In an opinion 
authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court upheld a long-standing 
reading of the Federal Housing Act as incorporating a disparate 
impact test.280 I do not want to read too much into this case, as 
everything Justice Kennedy gave in the beginning of the opinion he 
took away at the end. He is not a full-blown liberal quite yet. But in 
light of our expectations prior to the case and what we took to be the 
continued demise of the Second Reconstruction, one case at a time, it 
is hard not to read the opinion as a respite from Shelby County. The 
Second Reconstruction might even be safe for now. How to explain 
it?
One answer returns to the central point of the Article: As a 
super median, Justice Kennedy pays attention to public preferences 
and the real-life impact of his decisions. He is not ready, as the 
nation is not ready, for the Second Reconstruction to end. Another 
answer is that, quite simply, the dignitary interests present in Shelby 
County are not present in the disparate impact analysis. Shelby 
County, as with the preclearance regime, may be sui generis.  
A third answer looks to the specific context of the decided 
cases. In Shelby County, Justice Kennedy could look to the voter 
registration and turnout figures and be comforted by the fact that 
much has improved.281 The same cannot be said for housing, as rapid 
suburbanization has moved the country away from the problems that 
the Kerner Commission Report flagged generations ago. The dream 
of an integrated society remains a dream. Or as Justice Kennedy put 
it in his concurring opinion in Parents Involved, Justice Harlan’s 
paean to the colorblind principle in his Plessy dissent remains an 
elusive ideal.282 “In the real world,” Justice Kennedy wrote, “it is 
regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional principle.”283
Whether rightly or wrongly, it stands to reason that the same “real 
world” that led Justice Kennedy to soften his views in Parents 
Involved led him to soften them in the context of housing. After all, 
as in Parents Involved, “the problem before us defies so easy a 
solution.”284 This is another way of saying that if the recent past is 
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any indication, both context and history should lead Justice Kennedy 
to uphold the constitutionality of the Second Reconstruction. 
CONCLUSION
The fate of the Second Reconstruction rests in the hands of 
Justice Kennedy. At first glance, this is a concern for anybody who 
cares about racial justice. But Justice Kennedy’s recent 
jurisprudential turn on questions of race, which this Article explains 
by pointing to his status on the Court as a super median, is 
encouraging. This is an encouraging turn not because Justice 
Kennedy will ultimately reach the right answers to these questions, 
whatever those answers may be, but because he is turning away from 
the crass formalism on questions of race that exemplified his early 
jurisprudence. These are difficult questions, and Justice Kennedy is 
giving them their due attention. 
